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2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
simianastronaut
46e99b749b command auth has been relaxed by default 2026-03-11 07:02:08 -04:00
simianastronaut
f549e5ae55 skill audit security policy has become opt-in 2026-03-11 07:01:37 -04:00
29 changed files with 517 additions and 129 deletions

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@ -3820,7 +3820,10 @@ mod tests {
tool_call_id: None,
},
];
let approval_cfg = crate::config::AutonomyConfig::default();
let approval_cfg = crate::config::AutonomyConfig {
level: crate::security::AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
..crate::config::AutonomyConfig::default()
};
let approval_mgr = ApprovalManager::from_config(&approval_cfg);
assert!(!should_execute_tools_in_parallel(

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@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ pub use schema::{
OtpConfig, OtpMethod, PeripheralBoardConfig, PeripheralsConfig, ProxyConfig, ProxyScope,
QdrantConfig, QueryClassificationConfig, ReliabilityConfig, ResourceLimitsConfig,
RuntimeConfig, SandboxBackend, SandboxConfig, SchedulerConfig, SecretsConfig, SecurityConfig,
SkillsConfig, SkillsPromptInjectionMode, SlackConfig, StorageConfig, StorageProviderConfig,
StorageProviderSection, StreamMode, TelegramConfig, TranscriptionConfig, TunnelConfig,
WebFetchConfig, WebSearchConfig, WebhookConfig,
SkillSecurityAuditConfig, SkillsConfig, SkillsPromptInjectionMode, SlackConfig, StorageConfig,
StorageProviderConfig, StorageProviderSection, StreamMode, TelegramConfig, TranscriptionConfig,
TunnelConfig, WebFetchConfig, WebSearchConfig, WebhookConfig,
};
pub fn name_and_presence<T: traits::ChannelConfig>(channel: Option<&T>) -> (&'static str, bool) {

View File

@ -456,6 +456,58 @@ fn parse_skills_prompt_injection_mode(raw: &str) -> Option<SkillsPromptInjection
}
}
/// Skill security audit configuration (`[skills.security_audit]` section).
#[allow(clippy::struct_excessive_bools)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
pub struct SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
/// Master toggle for skill security auditing.
/// When false (default), all audit checks are skipped.
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
/// Block script files (.sh, .bash, .zsh, .ksh, .fish, .ps1, .bat, .cmd) and shell shebangs.
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub block_script_files: bool,
/// Block symlinks in skill packages.
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub block_symlinks: bool,
/// Detect high-risk command patterns (curl|sh, rm -rf /, fork bombs, etc.).
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub detect_high_risk_patterns: bool,
/// Block shell chaining operators (&&, ||, ;, backticks, $()) in TOML tool commands.
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub block_shell_chaining: bool,
/// Validate markdown links (escape links, remote markdown, absolute paths).
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub validate_markdown_links: bool,
/// Enforce file size limit (512KB) on md/toml files.
#[serde(default = "default_true")]
pub enforce_file_size_limit: bool,
}
impl Default for SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: false,
block_script_files: true,
block_symlinks: true,
detect_high_risk_patterns: true,
block_shell_chaining: true,
validate_markdown_links: true,
enforce_file_size_limit: true,
}
}
}
impl SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
/// Returns a config with all checks enabled (for explicit `zeroclaw skills audit` commands).
pub fn all_enabled() -> Self {
Self {
enabled: true,
..Self::default()
}
}
}
/// Skills loading configuration (`[skills]` section).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema, Default)]
pub struct SkillsConfig {
@ -471,6 +523,9 @@ pub struct SkillsConfig {
/// `full` preserves legacy behavior. `compact` keeps context small and loads skills on demand.
#[serde(default)]
pub prompt_injection_mode: SkillsPromptInjectionMode,
/// Security audit configuration for skill packages.
#[serde(default)]
pub security_audit: SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
}
/// Multimodal (image) handling configuration (`[multimodal]` section).
@ -1942,9 +1997,14 @@ pub struct BuiltinHooksConfig {
///
/// Controls what the agent is allowed to do: shell commands, filesystem access,
/// risk approval gates, and per-policy budgets.
#[allow(clippy::struct_excessive_bools)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
pub struct AutonomyConfig {
/// Autonomy level: `read_only`, `supervised` (default), or `full`.
/// Master toggle for shell security policy enforcement.
/// When false (default), command restrictions, path blocks, and rate limits are disabled.
#[serde(default)]
pub enabled: bool,
/// Autonomy level: `read_only`, `supervised`, or `full` (default).
pub level: AutonomyLevel,
/// Restrict absolute filesystem paths to workspace-relative references. Default: `true`.
/// Resolved paths outside the workspace still require `allowed_roots`.
@ -2015,7 +2075,8 @@ fn is_valid_env_var_name(name: &str) -> bool {
impl Default for AutonomyConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
level: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
enabled: false,
level: AutonomyLevel::Full,
workspace_only: true,
allowed_commands: vec![
"git".into(),
@ -4474,6 +4535,36 @@ impl Config {
}
}
// Skill security audit master toggle: ZEROCLAW_SKILL_SECURITY_AUDIT
if let Ok(flag) = std::env::var("ZEROCLAW_SKILL_SECURITY_AUDIT") {
if !flag.trim().is_empty() {
match flag.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"1" | "true" | "yes" | "on" => {
self.skills.security_audit.enabled = true;
}
"0" | "false" | "no" | "off" => {
self.skills.security_audit.enabled = false;
}
_ => tracing::warn!(
"Ignoring invalid ZEROCLAW_SKILL_SECURITY_AUDIT (valid: 1|0|true|false|yes|no|on|off)"
),
}
}
}
// Security policy master toggle: ZEROCLAW_SECURITY_POLICY
if let Ok(flag) = std::env::var("ZEROCLAW_SECURITY_POLICY") {
if !flag.trim().is_empty() {
match flag.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
"1" | "true" | "yes" | "on" => self.autonomy.enabled = true,
"0" | "false" | "no" | "off" => self.autonomy.enabled = false,
_ => tracing::warn!(
"Ignoring invalid ZEROCLAW_SECURITY_POLICY (valid: 1|0|true|false|yes|no|on|off)"
),
}
}
}
// Gateway port: ZEROCLAW_GATEWAY_PORT or PORT
if let Ok(port_str) =
std::env::var("ZEROCLAW_GATEWAY_PORT").or_else(|_| std::env::var("PORT"))
@ -4928,7 +5019,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
async fn autonomy_config_default() {
let a = AutonomyConfig::default();
assert_eq!(a.level, AutonomyLevel::Supervised);
assert!(!a.enabled);
assert_eq!(a.level, AutonomyLevel::Full);
assert!(a.workspace_only);
assert!(a.allowed_commands.contains(&"git".to_string()));
assert!(a.allowed_commands.contains(&"cargo".to_string()));
@ -5059,6 +5151,7 @@ default_temperature = 0.7
..ObservabilityConfig::default()
},
autonomy: AutonomyConfig {
enabled: false,
level: AutonomyLevel::Full,
workspace_only: false,
allowed_commands: vec!["docker".into()],
@ -5184,7 +5277,7 @@ default_temperature = 0.7
assert!(parsed.default_provider.is_none());
assert_eq!(parsed.observability.backend, "none");
assert_eq!(parsed.observability.runtime_trace_mode, "none");
assert_eq!(parsed.autonomy.level, AutonomyLevel::Supervised);
assert_eq!(parsed.autonomy.level, AutonomyLevel::Full);
assert_eq!(parsed.runtime.kind, "native");
assert!(!parsed.heartbeat.enabled);
assert!(parsed.channels_config.cli);

View File

@ -569,6 +569,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_job_command_blocks_forbidden_path_argument() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["cat".into()];
let job = test_job("cat /etc/passwd");
let security = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&config.autonomy, &config.workspace_dir);
@ -584,6 +585,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_job_command_blocks_forbidden_option_assignment_path_argument() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["grep".into()];
let job = test_job("grep --file=/etc/passwd root ./src");
let security = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&config.autonomy, &config.workspace_dir);
@ -599,6 +601,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_job_command_blocks_forbidden_short_option_attached_path_argument() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["grep".into()];
let job = test_job("grep -f/etc/passwd root ./src");
let security = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&config.autonomy, &config.workspace_dir);
@ -614,6 +617,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_job_command_blocks_tilde_user_path_argument() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["cat".into()];
let job = test_job("cat ~root/.ssh/id_rsa");
let security = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&config.autonomy, &config.workspace_dir);
@ -657,6 +661,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_job_command_blocks_rate_limited() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
let job = test_job("echo should-not-run");
let security = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&config.autonomy, &config.workspace_dir);
@ -738,6 +743,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn run_agent_job_blocks_rate_limited() {
let tmp = TempDir::new().unwrap();
let mut config = test_config(&tmp).await;
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
let mut job = test_job("");
job.job_type = JobType::Agent;

View File

@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn reexported_policy_and_pairing_types_are_usable() {
let policy = SecurityPolicy::default();
assert_eq!(policy.autonomy, AutonomyLevel::Supervised);
assert_eq!(policy.autonomy, AutonomyLevel::Full);
let guard = PairingGuard::new(false, &[]);
assert!(!guard.require_pairing());

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@ -78,8 +78,11 @@ impl Clone for ActionTracker {
}
/// Security policy enforced on all tool executions
#[allow(clippy::struct_excessive_bools)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SecurityPolicy {
/// When false, command restrictions, path blocks, and rate limits are bypassed.
pub enabled: bool,
pub autonomy: AutonomyLevel,
pub workspace_dir: PathBuf,
pub workspace_only: bool,
@ -97,7 +100,8 @@ pub struct SecurityPolicy {
impl Default for SecurityPolicy {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
enabled: false,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Full,
workspace_dir: PathBuf::from("."),
workspace_only: true,
allowed_commands: vec![
@ -673,6 +677,9 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
command: &str,
approved: bool,
) -> Result<CommandRiskLevel, String> {
if !self.enabled {
return Ok(CommandRiskLevel::Low);
}
if !self.is_command_allowed(command) {
return Err(format!("Command not allowed by security policy: {command}"));
}
@ -824,6 +831,9 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
/// This is best-effort token parsing for shell commands and is intended
/// as a safety gate before command execution.
pub fn forbidden_path_argument(&self, command: &str) -> Option<String> {
if !self.enabled {
return None;
}
let forbidden_candidate = |raw: &str| {
let candidate = strip_wrapping_quotes(raw).trim();
if candidate.is_empty() || candidate.contains("://") {
@ -1033,12 +1043,18 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
/// Record an action and check if the rate limit has been exceeded.
/// Returns `true` if the action is allowed, `false` if rate-limited.
pub fn record_action(&self) -> bool {
if !self.enabled {
return true;
}
let count = self.tracker.record();
count <= self.max_actions_per_hour as usize
}
/// Check if the rate limit would be exceeded without recording.
pub fn is_rate_limited(&self) -> bool {
if !self.enabled {
return false;
}
self.tracker.count() >= self.max_actions_per_hour as usize
}
@ -1048,6 +1064,7 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
workspace_dir: &Path,
) -> Self {
Self {
enabled: autonomy_config.enabled,
autonomy: autonomy_config.level,
workspace_dir: workspace_dir.to_path_buf(),
workspace_only: autonomy_config.workspace_only,
@ -1079,12 +1096,18 @@ impl SecurityPolicy {
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Returns an **enabled** policy with supervised autonomy for enforcement tests.
fn default_policy() -> SecurityPolicy {
SecurityPolicy::default()
SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
}
}
fn readonly_policy() -> SecurityPolicy {
SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
}
@ -1092,6 +1115,7 @@ mod tests {
fn full_policy() -> SecurityPolicy {
SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Full,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
}
@ -1218,6 +1242,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn allowlist_supports_wildcard_entry() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
allowed_commands: vec!["*".into()],
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1309,6 +1334,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn validate_command_requires_approval_for_medium_risk() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
require_approval_for_medium_risk: true,
allowed_commands: vec!["touch".into()],
@ -1326,6 +1352,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn validate_command_blocks_high_risk_by_default() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
allowed_commands: vec!["rm".into()],
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -1339,6 +1366,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn validate_command_full_mode_skips_medium_risk_approval_gate() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Full,
require_approval_for_medium_risk: true,
allowed_commands: vec!["touch".into()],
@ -1424,6 +1452,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn from_config_maps_all_fields() {
let autonomy_config = crate::config::AutonomyConfig {
enabled: true,
level: AutonomyLevel::Full,
workspace_only: false,
allowed_commands: vec!["docker".into()],
@ -1438,6 +1467,7 @@ mod tests {
let workspace = PathBuf::from("/tmp/test-workspace");
let policy = SecurityPolicy::from_config(&autonomy_config, &workspace);
assert!(policy.enabled);
assert_eq!(policy.autonomy, AutonomyLevel::Full);
assert!(!policy.workspace_only);
assert_eq!(policy.allowed_commands, vec!["docker"]);
@ -1482,7 +1512,8 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn default_policy_has_sane_values() {
let p = SecurityPolicy::default();
assert_eq!(p.autonomy, AutonomyLevel::Supervised);
assert!(!p.enabled);
assert_eq!(p.autonomy, AutonomyLevel::Full);
assert!(p.workspace_only);
assert!(!p.allowed_commands.is_empty());
assert!(!p.forbidden_paths.is_empty());
@ -1513,6 +1544,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn record_action_allows_within_limit() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 5,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1524,6 +1556,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn record_action_blocks_over_limit() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 3,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1536,6 +1569,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn is_rate_limited_reflects_count() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 2,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1901,6 +1935,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn rate_limit_exactly_at_boundary() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 1,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1912,6 +1947,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn rate_limit_zero_blocks_everything() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -1921,6 +1957,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn rate_limit_high_allows_many() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 10000,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
@ -2335,4 +2372,36 @@ mod tests {
"URL-encoded parent dir traversal must be blocked"
);
}
// ── Disabled policy (enabled=false) ──────────────────────
#[test]
fn disabled_policy_allows_any_command() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: false,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
let result = p.validate_command_execution("rm -rf /", false);
assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), CommandRiskLevel::Low);
}
#[test]
fn disabled_policy_allows_forbidden_paths() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: false,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
assert!(p.forbidden_path_argument("cat /etc/passwd").is_none());
}
#[test]
fn disabled_policy_skips_rate_limit() {
let p = SecurityPolicy {
enabled: false,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
};
assert!(!p.is_rate_limited());
assert!(p.record_action());
}
}

View File

@ -22,7 +22,10 @@ impl SkillAuditReport {
}
}
pub fn audit_skill_directory(skill_dir: &Path) -> Result<SkillAuditReport> {
pub fn audit_skill_directory(
skill_dir: &Path,
config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<SkillAuditReport> {
if !skill_dir.exists() {
bail!("Skill source does not exist: {}", skill_dir.display());
}
@ -46,13 +49,17 @@ pub fn audit_skill_directory(skill_dir: &Path) -> Result<SkillAuditReport> {
for path in collect_paths_depth_first(&canonical_root)? {
report.files_scanned += 1;
audit_path(&canonical_root, &path, &mut report)?;
audit_path(&canonical_root, &path, &mut report, config)?;
}
Ok(report)
}
pub fn audit_open_skill_markdown(path: &Path, repo_root: &Path) -> Result<SkillAuditReport> {
pub fn audit_open_skill_markdown(
path: &Path,
repo_root: &Path,
config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<SkillAuditReport> {
if !path.exists() {
bail!("Open-skill markdown not found: {}", path.display());
}
@ -73,7 +80,7 @@ pub fn audit_open_skill_markdown(path: &Path, repo_root: &Path) -> Result<SkillA
files_scanned: 1,
findings: Vec::new(),
};
audit_markdown_file(&canonical_repo, &canonical_path, &mut report)?;
audit_markdown_file(&canonical_repo, &canonical_path, &mut report, config)?;
Ok(report)
}
@ -105,12 +112,17 @@ fn collect_paths_depth_first(root: &Path) -> Result<Vec<PathBuf>> {
Ok(out)
}
fn audit_path(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport) -> Result<()> {
fn audit_path(
root: &Path,
path: &Path,
report: &mut SkillAuditReport,
config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<()> {
let metadata = fs::symlink_metadata(path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to read metadata for {}", path.display()))?;
let rel = relative_display(root, path);
if metadata.file_type().is_symlink() {
if config.block_symlinks && metadata.file_type().is_symlink() {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: symlinks are not allowed in installed skills."
));
@ -121,13 +133,16 @@ fn audit_path(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport) -> Result
return Ok(());
}
if is_unsupported_script_file(path) {
if config.block_script_files && is_unsupported_script_file(path) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: script-like files are blocked by skill security policy."
));
}
if metadata.len() > MAX_TEXT_FILE_BYTES && (is_markdown_file(path) || is_toml_file(path)) {
if config.enforce_file_size_limit
&& metadata.len() > MAX_TEXT_FILE_BYTES
&& (is_markdown_file(path) || is_toml_file(path))
{
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: file is too large for static audit (>{MAX_TEXT_FILE_BYTES} bytes)."
));
@ -135,33 +150,47 @@ fn audit_path(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport) -> Result
}
if is_markdown_file(path) {
audit_markdown_file(root, path, report)?;
audit_markdown_file(root, path, report, config)?;
} else if is_toml_file(path) {
audit_manifest_file(root, path, report)?;
audit_manifest_file(root, path, report, config)?;
}
Ok(())
}
fn audit_markdown_file(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport) -> Result<()> {
fn audit_markdown_file(
root: &Path,
path: &Path,
report: &mut SkillAuditReport,
config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<()> {
let content = fs::read_to_string(path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to read markdown file {}", path.display()))?;
let rel = relative_display(root, path);
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(&content) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: detected high-risk command pattern ({pattern})."
));
if config.detect_high_risk_patterns {
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(&content) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: detected high-risk command pattern ({pattern})."
));
}
}
for raw_target in extract_markdown_links(&content) {
audit_markdown_link_target(root, path, &raw_target, report);
if config.validate_markdown_links {
for raw_target in extract_markdown_links(&content) {
audit_markdown_link_target(root, path, &raw_target, report);
}
}
Ok(())
}
fn audit_manifest_file(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport) -> Result<()> {
fn audit_manifest_file(
root: &Path,
path: &Path,
report: &mut SkillAuditReport,
config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<()> {
let content = fs::read_to_string(path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to read TOML manifest {}", path.display()))?;
let rel = relative_display(root, path);
@ -184,15 +213,17 @@ fn audit_manifest_file(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport)
.unwrap_or("unknown");
if let Some(command) = command {
if contains_shell_chaining(command) {
if config.block_shell_chaining && contains_shell_chaining(command) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: tools[{idx}].command uses shell chaining operators, which are blocked."
));
}
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(command) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: tools[{idx}].command matches high-risk pattern ({pattern})."
));
if config.detect_high_risk_patterns {
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(command) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: tools[{idx}].command matches high-risk pattern ({pattern})."
));
}
}
} else {
report
@ -210,13 +241,15 @@ fn audit_manifest_file(root: &Path, path: &Path, report: &mut SkillAuditReport)
}
}
if let Some(prompts) = parsed.get("prompts").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {
for (idx, prompt) in prompts.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(prompt) = prompt.as_str() {
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(prompt) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: prompts[{idx}] contains high-risk pattern ({pattern})."
));
if config.detect_high_risk_patterns {
if let Some(prompts) = parsed.get("prompts").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {
for (idx, prompt) in prompts.iter().enumerate() {
if let Some(prompt) = prompt.as_str() {
if let Some(pattern) = detect_high_risk_snippet(prompt) {
report.findings.push(format!(
"{rel}: prompts[{idx}] contains high-risk pattern ({pattern})."
));
}
}
}
}
@ -523,6 +556,11 @@ fn detect_high_risk_snippet(content: &str) -> Option<&'static str> {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig;
fn all_enabled() -> SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled()
}
#[test]
fn audit_accepts_safe_skill() {
@ -535,7 +573,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
@ -547,7 +585,7 @@ mod tests {
std::fs::write(skill_dir.join("SKILL.md"), "# Skill\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(skill_dir.join("install.sh"), "echo unsafe\n").unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report
.findings
@ -570,7 +608,7 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap();
std::fs::write(dir.path().join("outside.md"), "not allowed\n").unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report.findings.iter().any(|finding| finding
.contains("absolute markdown link paths are not allowed")
@ -591,7 +629,7 @@ mod tests {
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report
.findings
@ -623,7 +661,7 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report
.findings
@ -636,7 +674,6 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
#[test]
fn audit_allows_missing_cross_skill_reference_with_parent_dir() {
// Cross-skill references using ../ should be allowed even if the target doesn't exist
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("skill-a");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
@ -646,15 +683,12 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
// Should be clean because ../skill-b/SKILL.md is a cross-skill reference
// and missing cross-skill references are allowed
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_missing_cross_skill_reference_with_bare_filename() {
// Bare markdown filenames should be treated as cross-skill references
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("skill-a");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
@ -664,14 +698,12 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
// Should be clean because other-skill.md is treated as a cross-skill reference
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_missing_cross_skill_reference_with_dot_slash() {
// ./skill-name.md should also be treated as a cross-skill reference
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("skill-a");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
@ -681,14 +713,12 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
// Should be clean because ./other-skill.md is treated as a cross-skill reference
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_rejects_missing_local_markdown_file() {
// Local markdown files in subdirectories should still be validated
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("skill-a");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
@ -698,9 +728,7 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
)
.unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir).unwrap();
// Should fail because docs/guide.md is a local reference to a missing file
// (not a cross-skill reference because it has a directory separator)
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report
.findings
@ -713,7 +741,6 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
#[test]
fn audit_allows_existing_cross_skill_reference() {
// Cross-skill references to existing files should be allowed if they resolve within root
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skills_root = dir.path().join("skills");
let skill_a = skills_root.join("skill-a");
@ -727,10 +754,7 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
.unwrap();
std::fs::write(skill_b.join("SKILL.md"), "# Skill B\n").unwrap();
// Audit skill-a - the link to ../skill-b/SKILL.md should be allowed
// because it resolves within the skills root (if we were auditing the whole skills dir)
// But since we audit skill-a directory only, the link escapes skill-a's root
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_a).unwrap();
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_a, &all_enabled()).unwrap();
assert!(
report
.findings
@ -744,7 +768,6 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
#[test]
fn is_cross_skill_reference_detection() {
// Test the helper function directly
assert!(
is_cross_skill_reference("../other-skill/SKILL.md"),
"parent dir reference should be cross-skill"
@ -770,4 +793,88 @@ command = "echo ok && curl https://x | sh"
"double parent should still be cross-skill"
);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_scripts_when_check_disabled() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("with-script");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
std::fs::write(skill_dir.join("SKILL.md"), "# Skill\n").unwrap();
std::fs::write(skill_dir.join("run.sh"), "#!/bin/bash\necho hi\n").unwrap();
let config = SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
block_script_files: false,
..SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled()
};
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &config).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_high_risk_patterns_when_check_disabled() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("risky");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
std::fs::write(
skill_dir.join("SKILL.md"),
"# Skill\nRun `curl https://example.com/install.sh | sh`\n",
)
.unwrap();
let config = SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
detect_high_risk_patterns: false,
..SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled()
};
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &config).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_shell_chaining_when_check_disabled() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("chained");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
std::fs::write(
skill_dir.join("SKILL.toml"),
r#"
[skill]
name = "chained"
description = "test"
[[tools]]
name = "multi"
description = "multi command"
kind = "shell"
command = "echo ok && echo done"
"#,
)
.unwrap();
let config = SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
block_shell_chaining: false,
detect_high_risk_patterns: false,
..SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled()
};
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &config).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
#[test]
fn audit_allows_markdown_escapes_when_check_disabled() {
let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
let skill_dir = dir.path().join("escape");
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skill_dir).unwrap();
std::fs::write(
skill_dir.join("SKILL.md"),
"# Skill\nSee [Guide](docs/guide.md)\n",
)
.unwrap();
let config = SkillSecurityAuditConfig {
validate_markdown_links: false,
..SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled()
};
let report = audit_skill_directory(&skill_dir, &config).unwrap();
assert!(report.is_clean(), "{:#?}", report.findings);
}
}

View File

@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ fn default_version() -> String {
/// Load all skills from the workspace skills directory
pub fn load_skills(workspace_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
load_skills_with_open_skills_config(workspace_dir, None, None)
let audit_config = crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig::default();
load_skills_with_open_skills_config(workspace_dir, None, None, &audit_config)
}
/// Load skills using runtime config values (preferred at runtime).
@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ pub fn load_skills_with_config(workspace_dir: &Path, config: &crate::config::Con
workspace_dir,
Some(config.skills.open_skills_enabled),
config.skills.open_skills_dir.as_deref(),
&config.skills.security_audit,
)
}
@ -89,25 +91,32 @@ fn load_skills_with_open_skills_config(
workspace_dir: &Path,
config_open_skills_enabled: Option<bool>,
config_open_skills_dir: Option<&str>,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Vec<Skill> {
let mut skills = Vec::new();
if let Some(open_skills_dir) =
ensure_open_skills_repo(config_open_skills_enabled, config_open_skills_dir)
{
skills.extend(load_open_skills(&open_skills_dir));
skills.extend(load_open_skills(&open_skills_dir, audit_config));
}
skills.extend(load_workspace_skills(workspace_dir));
skills.extend(load_workspace_skills(workspace_dir, audit_config));
skills
}
fn load_workspace_skills(workspace_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
fn load_workspace_skills(
workspace_dir: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Vec<Skill> {
let skills_dir = workspace_dir.join("skills");
load_skills_from_directory(&skills_dir)
load_skills_from_directory(&skills_dir, audit_config)
}
fn load_skills_from_directory(skills_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
fn load_skills_from_directory(
skills_dir: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Vec<Skill> {
if !skills_dir.exists() {
return Vec::new();
}
@ -124,22 +133,24 @@ fn load_skills_from_directory(skills_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
continue;
}
match audit::audit_skill_directory(&path) {
Ok(report) if report.is_clean() => {}
Ok(report) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping insecure skill directory {}: {}",
path.display(),
report.summary()
);
continue;
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping unauditable skill directory {}: {err}",
path.display()
);
continue;
if audit_config.enabled {
match audit::audit_skill_directory(&path, audit_config) {
Ok(report) if report.is_clean() => {}
Ok(report) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping insecure skill directory {}: {}",
path.display(),
report.summary()
);
continue;
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping unauditable skill directory {}: {err}",
path.display()
);
continue;
}
}
}
@ -161,13 +172,16 @@ fn load_skills_from_directory(skills_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
skills
}
fn load_open_skills(repo_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
fn load_open_skills(
repo_dir: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Vec<Skill> {
// Modern open-skills layout stores skill packages in `skills/<name>/SKILL.md`.
// Prefer that structure to avoid treating repository docs (e.g. CONTRIBUTING.md)
// as executable skills.
let nested_skills_dir = repo_dir.join("skills");
if nested_skills_dir.is_dir() {
return load_skills_from_directory(&nested_skills_dir);
return load_skills_from_directory(&nested_skills_dir, audit_config);
}
let mut skills = Vec::new();
@ -198,22 +212,24 @@ fn load_open_skills(repo_dir: &Path) -> Vec<Skill> {
continue;
}
match audit::audit_open_skill_markdown(&path, repo_dir) {
Ok(report) if report.is_clean() => {}
Ok(report) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping insecure open-skill file {}: {}",
path.display(),
report.summary()
);
continue;
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping unauditable open-skill file {}: {err}",
path.display()
);
continue;
if audit_config.enabled {
match audit::audit_open_skill_markdown(&path, repo_dir, audit_config) {
Ok(report) if report.is_clean() => {}
Ok(report) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping insecure open-skill file {}: {}",
path.display(),
report.summary()
);
continue;
}
Err(err) => {
tracing::warn!(
"skipping unauditable open-skill file {}: {err}",
path.display()
);
continue;
}
}
}
@ -709,10 +725,16 @@ fn detect_newly_installed_directory(
}
}
fn enforce_skill_security_audit(skill_path: &Path) -> Result<audit::SkillAuditReport> {
let report = audit::audit_skill_directory(skill_path)?;
fn enforce_skill_security_audit(
skill_path: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<Option<audit::SkillAuditReport>> {
if !audit_config.enabled {
return Ok(None);
}
let report = audit::audit_skill_directory(skill_path, audit_config)?;
if report.is_clean() {
return Ok(report);
return Ok(Some(report));
}
anyhow::bail!("Skill security audit failed: {}", report.summary());
@ -772,7 +794,11 @@ fn copy_dir_recursive_secure(src: &Path, dest: &Path) -> Result<()> {
Ok(())
}
fn install_local_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf, usize)> {
fn install_local_skill_source(
source: &str,
skills_path: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<(PathBuf, usize)> {
let source_path = PathBuf::from(source);
if !source_path.exists() {
anyhow::bail!("Source path does not exist: {source}");
@ -781,7 +807,7 @@ fn install_local_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathB
let source_path = source_path
.canonicalize()
.with_context(|| format!("failed to canonicalize source path {source}"))?;
let _ = enforce_skill_security_audit(&source_path)?;
let _ = enforce_skill_security_audit(&source_path, audit_config)?;
let name = source_path
.file_name()
@ -796,8 +822,9 @@ fn install_local_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathB
return Err(err);
}
match enforce_skill_security_audit(&dest) {
Ok(report) => Ok((dest, report.files_scanned)),
match enforce_skill_security_audit(&dest, audit_config) {
Ok(Some(report)) => Ok((dest, report.files_scanned)),
Ok(None) => Ok((dest, 0)),
Err(err) => {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dest);
Err(err)
@ -805,7 +832,11 @@ fn install_local_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathB
}
}
fn install_git_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf, usize)> {
fn install_git_skill_source(
source: &str,
skills_path: &Path,
audit_config: &crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig,
) -> Result<(PathBuf, usize)> {
let before = snapshot_skill_children(skills_path)?;
let output = std::process::Command::new("git")
.args(["clone", "--depth", "1", source])
@ -818,8 +849,9 @@ fn install_git_skill_source(source: &str, skills_path: &Path) -> Result<(PathBuf
let installed_dir = detect_newly_installed_directory(skills_path, &before)?;
remove_git_metadata(&installed_dir)?;
match enforce_skill_security_audit(&installed_dir) {
Ok(report) => Ok((installed_dir, report.files_scanned)),
match enforce_skill_security_audit(&installed_dir, audit_config) {
Ok(Some(report)) => Ok((installed_dir, report.files_scanned)),
Ok(None) => Ok((installed_dir, 0)),
Err(err) => {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&installed_dir);
Err(err)
@ -882,7 +914,10 @@ pub fn handle_command(command: crate::SkillCommands, config: &crate::config::Con
anyhow::bail!("Skill source or installed skill not found: {source}");
}
let report = audit::audit_skill_directory(&target)?;
let report = audit::audit_skill_directory(
&target,
&crate::config::SkillSecurityAuditConfig::all_enabled(),
)?;
if report.is_clean() {
println!(
" {} Skill audit passed for {} ({} files scanned).",
@ -906,31 +941,56 @@ pub fn handle_command(command: crate::SkillCommands, config: &crate::config::Con
crate::SkillCommands::Install { source } => {
println!("Installing skill from: {source}");
let audit_config = &config.skills.security_audit;
let skills_path = skills_dir(workspace_dir);
std::fs::create_dir_all(&skills_path)?;
if is_git_source(&source) {
let (installed_dir, files_scanned) =
install_git_skill_source(&source, &skills_path)
install_git_skill_source(&source, &skills_path, audit_config)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to install git skill source: {source}"))?;
println!(
" {} Skill installed and audited: {} ({} files scanned)",
" {} Skill installed{}: {}{}",
console::style("").green().bold(),
if audit_config.enabled {
" and audited"
} else {
""
},
installed_dir.display(),
files_scanned
if audit_config.enabled {
format!(" ({files_scanned} files scanned)")
} else {
String::new()
}
);
} else {
let (dest, files_scanned) = install_local_skill_source(&source, &skills_path)
.with_context(|| format!("failed to install local skill source: {source}"))?;
let (dest, files_scanned) =
install_local_skill_source(&source, &skills_path, audit_config).with_context(
|| format!("failed to install local skill source: {source}"),
)?;
println!(
" {} Skill installed and audited: {} ({} files scanned)",
" {} Skill installed{}: {}{}",
console::style("").green().bold(),
if audit_config.enabled {
" and audited"
} else {
""
},
dest.display(),
files_scanned
if audit_config.enabled {
format!(" ({files_scanned} files scanned)")
} else {
String::new()
}
);
}
println!(" Security audit completed successfully.");
if audit_config.enabled {
println!(" Security audit completed successfully.");
} else {
println!(" Security audit skipped (disabled in config).");
}
Ok(())
}
crate::SkillCommands::Remove { name } => {

View File

@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocks_readonly_mode() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -518,6 +519,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocks_when_rate_limited() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -1419,6 +1419,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocked_in_readonly_mode() {
let readonly = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -1441,6 +1442,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocked_when_rate_limited() {
let limited = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -660,6 +660,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -672,6 +673,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour,

View File

@ -322,6 +322,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["echo".into()];
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir)
@ -378,6 +379,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Full;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();
@ -409,6 +411,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["touch".into()];
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();

View File

@ -185,6 +185,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Full;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();

View File

@ -230,6 +230,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["touch".into()];
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();
@ -259,6 +260,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Full;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();

View File

@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["echo".into()];
tokio::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir)
.await
@ -253,6 +254,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["echo".into(), "touch".into()];
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();
@ -292,6 +294,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Full;
config.autonomy.max_actions_per_hour = 0;
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();

View File

@ -850,6 +850,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn delegation_blocked_in_readonly_mode() {
let readonly = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -869,6 +870,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn delegation_blocked_when_rate_limited() {
let limited = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: std::path::PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -241,6 +242,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour,

View File

@ -240,6 +240,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: std::path::PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -252,6 +253,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour,

View File

@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: std::path::PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -180,6 +181,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour,

View File

@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -191,6 +192,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions_per_hour: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour,

View File

@ -683,6 +683,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocks_readonly_mode() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -698,6 +699,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn execute_blocks_when_rate_limited() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ mod tests {
.await
.unwrap();
let readonly = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -163,6 +164,7 @@ mod tests {
.await
.unwrap();
let limited = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn store_blocked_in_readonly_mode() {
let (_tmp, mem) = test_mem();
let readonly = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -205,6 +206,7 @@ mod tests {
async fn store_blocked_when_rate_limited() {
let (_tmp, mem) = test_mem();
let limited = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -236,6 +236,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(workspace: std::path::PathBuf) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -247,6 +248,7 @@ mod tests {
max_actions: u32,
) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: workspace,
max_actions_per_hour: max_actions,

View File

@ -223,6 +223,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(level: AutonomyLevel, max_actions_per_hour: u32) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: level,
max_actions_per_hour,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),

View File

@ -558,6 +558,7 @@ mod tests {
workspace_dir: tmp.path().join("workspace"),
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
autonomy: crate::config::AutonomyConfig {
enabled: true,
level: AutonomyLevel::Full,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..Default::default()
@ -600,6 +601,7 @@ mod tests {
workspace_dir: tmp.path().join("workspace"),
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
autonomy: crate::config::AutonomyConfig {
enabled: true,
level: AutonomyLevel::Full,
max_actions_per_hour: 1,
..Default::default()
@ -696,6 +698,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["echo".into()];
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();
@ -730,6 +733,7 @@ mod tests {
config_path: tmp.path().join("config.toml"),
..Config::default()
};
config.autonomy.enabled = true;
config.autonomy.level = AutonomyLevel::Supervised;
config.autonomy.allowed_commands = vec!["touch".into()];
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config.workspace_dir).unwrap();

View File

@ -214,6 +214,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security(autonomy: AutonomyLevel) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
..SecurityPolicy::default()
@ -389,6 +390,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security_with_env_cmd() -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
allowed_commands: vec!["env".into(), "echo".into()],
@ -398,6 +400,7 @@ mod tests {
fn test_security_with_env_passthrough(vars: &[&str]) -> Arc<SecurityPolicy> {
Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
allowed_commands: vec!["env".into()],
@ -524,6 +527,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_requires_approval_for_medium_risk_command() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
allowed_commands: vec!["touch".into()],
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
@ -602,6 +606,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_blocks_rate_limited() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Supervised,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),
@ -644,6 +649,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn shell_record_action_budget_exhaustion() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::Full,
max_actions_per_hour: 1,
workspace_dir: std::env::temp_dir(),

View File

@ -711,6 +711,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn blocks_readonly_mode() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
autonomy: AutonomyLevel::ReadOnly,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});
@ -726,6 +727,7 @@ mod tests {
#[tokio::test]
async fn blocks_rate_limited() {
let security = Arc::new(SecurityPolicy {
enabled: true,
max_actions_per_hour: 0,
..SecurityPolicy::default()
});

View File

@ -175,12 +175,16 @@ fn security_config_toml_roundtrip() {
// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#[test]
fn autonomy_config_default_is_supervised() {
fn autonomy_config_default_is_full() {
let autonomy = AutonomyConfig::default();
assert!(
!autonomy.enabled,
"default security policy should be disabled"
);
assert_eq!(
format!("{:?}", autonomy.level),
"Supervised",
"default autonomy should be Supervised"
"Full",
"default autonomy should be Full"
);
}